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SEPARATION OF POWERS: LEGISLATORS SERVING
ON ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS
The principle of separation of powers is a cornerstone of the
American system of government.' America's early leaders considered
separation of powers to be of primary importance.2 Even though the
federal constitution and a number of state constitutions contain no ex-
press provisions requiring separation of powers, federal and state courts
that have considered the issue have held that separation of powers is a
' See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (proper
balance must be maintained between coordinate braches of government); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) (separation of powers woven into Constitution); O'Donoghue v. United
States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (separation of powers not merely matter of convenience or
governmental mechanism); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928) (separa-
tion of powers inherent in American constitutional system); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 190 (1880) (separation of powers one of chief merits of American system of written con-
stitutional law); Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 421 (9th Cir.
1980), appeal pending, 454 U.S. 812 (Oct. 5, 1981) (no. 80-1832) (doctrine of separation of
powers vital to constitutional government); Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska
1976) (separation of powers important to avoid consolidation of power in single branch of
government); Opinion of the Justices, 380 A.2d 109, 113 (Del. 1977) (separation of powers
fundamental principle of constitutional law); Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho 93, -, 369
P.2d 590,594 (1962) (state constitution requires separation of basic powers of the three branches
of government); Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 365 Mass. 639,
__ , 309 N.E.2d 476, 478 (1974) (separation of powers fundamental); Opinion of the
Justices, 110 N.H. 359, -, 266 A.2d 823, 825 (1970) (branches of government should be
as separate from and independent of each other as nature of free government will admit).
See generally 2 C. ANTIEAi, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11:13 (1969) (importance of
separation of powers in America throughout years); Parker, The Historic Basis of Ad-
ministrative Law: Separation of Powers and Judicial Supremacy, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 449
(1958); Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers'" 2 U. CHI.
L. REV. 385 (1935).
' See Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238 Ind. 120, - , 149 N.E.2d 273, 294-95
(1958) (quotation from Farewell Address by George Washington); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47,
48, 51 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1966); 1 ANDREWS, WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (1896); T. JEF-
FERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (W. Peden ed. 1955). In the Federalist Papers,
James Madison stressed the importance of preventing any one of the three branches of
government from possessing, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the other
two branches. TEE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 343. Madison observed that in the early American
state constitutions the legislative branch had powers which were much more extensive and
much less susceptible to precise limitation than the powers these constitutions granted to
the executive and judicial branches. Id. at 344. Madison was concerned that unless the
framers of the American Constitution clearly separated the powers of the three branches in
the Constitution and gave the executive and judicial branches effective checks against the
legislative branch, the legislature, by complicated and indirect means, would be able to en-
croach on the other two branches. Id. Madison stated that the nation's greatest safeguard
against a gradual concentration of all governmental powers in one branch of government lay
in giving the officials of each branch the necessary constitutional means and personal
motives to resist encroachment by the other branches. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356.
Madison, however, rejected an overly strict application of the separation of powers doc-
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constitutional requirement.' Separation of powers serves the important
purposes of preventing concentration of power in one branch of govern-
trine. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 338. Madison emphasized that separation of powers did not
require that the departments of government "have no partial agency in, or no control over,
the acts of each other." Id. Rather, stated Madison, separation of powers requires only that
"the whole power of one department" should not be exercised "by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department .... " (emphasis in original). Id. James
Wilson, one of the framers of the Constitution and later a Justice of the Supreme Court, em-
phasized that the independence of each branch of government, legislative, executive, and
judicial, required that each branch, in the exercise of its functions, should be free from the
remotest influence, direct or indirect, of the other two branches. ANDREWS, supra, at 367.
Thomas Jefferson observed that a major weakness of the Virginia Constitution of 1781 was
that the document provided no safeguards against concentration in the legislative branch of
the powers of all three branches of government. JEFFERSON, supra, at 120. Jefferson noted
that the result of such a concentration would be an elective despotism. Id. Jefferson stress-
ed that an elective despotism was not the type of government for which the American col-
onies fought. Id. Jefferson warned that unless the American Constitution divided the
powers of government among several branches and gave each branch effective checks on
the other branches, the American government would be no more than an elective
despotism. Id.
In his Farewell Address, George Washington warned that abuses of the separation of
powers doctrine could destroy the American system of government. 238 Ind. at _ , 149
N.E.2d at 294-95. Washington stressed the importance of dividing the powers of govern-
ment among the branches and giving each branch reciprocal checks on the other branches.
Id. at ___, 149 N.E.2d at 294. Washington stated that unless each branch jealously guarded
its powers from intrusion by the other branches, a spirit of encroachment would tend to con-
solidate the powers of all the branches into one. Id. at _ , 149 N.E.2d at 294. See
generally G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 at 150-61, 446-53,
602-06, 608 (1969) (development of separation of powers doctrine in America prior to framing
of Constitution).
' See Myers v. United States, 372 U.S. 52 (1926). The Myers Court noted that the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 embraced Montesquieu's view that the
maintenance of independence between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches was
essential to insure the liberty of the people. Id. at 116. The Myers Court reasoned that in
furtherance of Montesquieu's view, the framers of the Constitution set out the executive,
legislative, and judicial functions of the government in three distinct articles. Id. From this
clearcut division within the structure of the Constitution, the Myers Court concluded that
the Constitution required separation of powers. Id.; see also O'Donoghue v. United States,
289 U.S. 516 (1933). The O'Donoghue Court noted that, in distributing the powers of govern-
ment, the framers of the Constitution had created three distinct and separate departments.
Id. at 530. The O'Donoghue Court reasoned that the fact that the Constitution contained an
occasional specific provision which conferred powers upon one branch which by their nature
might belong to another branch served only to emphasize the framers' overriding desire to
keep the powers of government separate. Id. The O'Donoghue Court therefore joined the
Myers Court in inferring the requirement of separation of powers from the structure of
government set forth in the Constitution, even though the Constitution contains no express
provision which requires separation of powers.
The United States Constitution does not require the states to distribute governmental
power among branches of state government in a manner similar to the federal distribution.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (separation of powers concept embodied
in United States Constitution not mandatory in state governments); Parcell v. Kansas, 468
F.Supp. 1274, 1277 (D. Kan. 1979), aff'd sub nom Parcell v. Governmental Ethics Comm'n,
639 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1980) (distribution by state of power among its governmental branches is
[Vol. 40:171
SEPARATION OF POWERS
ment' and promoting governmental efficiency.' In accord with these two
purposes, both federal and state courts have found a wide variety of
governmental arrangements violative of the separation of powers prin-
ciple.'
for state itself to decide); Rite Aid Corp. v. Board of Pharmacy, 421 F.Supp. 1161, 1178 (D.
N.J. 1976) (federal doctrine of separation of powers is no limitation on state governments).
Federal separation of powers cases, therefore, do not control the resolution of separation of
powers questions litigated within the state courts. 468 F.Supp. at 1277. Nevertheless, state
courts have implied the requirement of separation of powers in the absence of an express
constitutional provision. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 380 A.2d 109, 113 (Del. 1977)
(separation of powers implied as fundamental aspect of state constitutional law); Vansickle
v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, __ , 511 P.2d 223, 241 (1973) (separation of powers inherent in
republican form "of government).
4 See, e.g., Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 422 (9th Cir.
1980), appeal pending, 454 U.S. 812 (Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-1832); Opinion of the Justices, 380
A.2d 109, 113 (Del. 1977); State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, -, 547 P.2d
786, 790 (1976). The Chadha court examined the historical background of separation of
powers and concluded that the reason the framers of the Constitution separated the three
branches and gave each branch checks over the other two was to prevent any one branch
from attaining hegemony. 634 F.2d at 422-23. In Opinion of the Justices, the Delaware
Supreme Court recognized the two main purposes of the separation of powers doctrine. 380
A.2d at 113. The first purpose is to protect the liberty of the citizens. Id. The court stated
that the second purpose is to safeguard the independence of each branch of government and
to protect each branch from domination and interference by the other branches. Id. The
Bennett court stated that the purpose of the separation of powers doctrine was to avoid the
dangerous concentration of power in one branch of government and to ensure an efficient
allocation of governmental functions among the several branches of government. 219 Kan.
at __ , 547 P.2d at 790. See generally, ANTIEAU, supra note 1, § 11:13 (historical back-
ground on primary purposes of separation of powers).
5 Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), appeal
pending, 454 U.S. 812 (Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-1832). The Chadha court noted that the doctrine
of separation of powers enhances the efficiency of government in two ways. 634 F.2d at 423.
First, the doctrine prevents the legislative branch from becoming entangled in the myriad
details arising from the execution of its laws. Id. The Chadha court further reasoned that a
corollary of the separation doctrine, the rule against undue delegation, prevents one branch
from abdicating its authority in a wholesale and standardless manner. Id. at 424. The rule
against undue delegation prohibits one branch of government from abdicating or transfer-
ing its essential constitutionally assigned duties to either another branch of government or
to a private entity. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935). See
generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 28-86 (1965) (delegation of
legislative power to administrative agencies); 1 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.03 (1982) (delegation of power); Davis, A New Approach to Delega-
tion, 36 U. CHL L. REV. 713 (1969) (same); Annot., Permissible Limits of Delegation of
Legislative Power, 79 L.Ed. 474, 485 (1935) (same).
8 See, e.g., O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 551 (1933) (congressional reduc-
tion of salaries of federal judges already in office violative of separation of powers); Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (requirement of Senate consent prior to President's ex-
ercise of power to remove executive officers violative of separation of powers); Chadha v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1980), appeal pending,
454 U.S. 812 (Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-1832) (congressional veto of administrative determination
violates separation of powers); Anderson v. Lamm, 195 Colo. 437, ___._, 579 P.2d 620, 627
(1978) (requirement that governor obtain legislative approval prior to making allocations of
1983]
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In recent years the courts have confronted separation of powers
questions with increasing frequency in cases involving legislators serv-
ing on administrative boards.' The issue usually arises when a state
legislature enacts a measure providing for membership of legislators on
an administrative board.' Then, typically, either private taxpayers or
state executive or administrative officials bring a lawsuit challenging
the legislators' service on the board as violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers? Although resolution by the courts of the separa-
tion of powers issues raised by legislators serving on administrative
funds already appropriated by legislature contravenes separation of powers); Opinion of the
Justices, 380 A.2d 109, 116 (Del. 1977) (wholesale transfer of division of maintenance for
state office buildings from executive branch control to legislative branch control violative of
separation of powers).
See, e.g., Starnes v. Sadler, 237 Ark. 325, __ , 372 S.W.2d 585, 585-86 (1963) (tax-
payers brought action charging that legislators' service on Board of Pardons and Parole and
State Board of Higher Education violated separation of powers); Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667,
667, 212 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1975) (attorney general instituted declaratory judgment action
challenging right of legislators to serve on governing board of World Congress Center);
Murphy v. State, 233 Ga. 681, 681, 212 S.E.2d 839, 840 (1975) (attorney general brought ac-
tion charging that appointment of legislators as members of State Properties Commission
violated separation of powers); Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho 93, __, 369 P.2d 590, 592
(1962) (state auditor refused to issue warrants to cover expenses incurred by legislative
members of State Children's Commission on grounds that legislators' service on commission
violated separation of powers); Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238 Ind. 120, _ 149
N.E.2d 273, 277-78 (1958) (taxpayer alleged that legislators' service on State Office Building
Commission violated separation of powers); Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, ,
266 A.2d 823, 824 (1970) (governor sought advisory opinion on whether statute requiring
that governor submit proposed salary increases of executive branch officials to fiscal com-
mittee of legislature for approval violated separation of powers); State ex rel. Wallace v.
Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 591-92, 286 S.E.2d 79, 79-80 (1982) (attorney general alleged that
legislators' service on Environmental Management Commission compromised separation of
powers doctrine); Aiken County Bd. of Educ. v. Knotts, 274 S.C. 144, 146-47, 262 S.E.2d 14,
15-16 (1980) (county board of education charged that state statute requiring that county
legislative delegation approve any increase in school tax leview violated separation of
powers).
' See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 244 Ala. 386, 387-89, 13 So.2d 674, 675-77 (1943)
(legislative act providing for appointment of legislators to War Emergency Council); Smith
v. Faubus, 230 Ark. 831, -, 327 S.W.2d 562, 562-64 (1959) (statute allowing legislative
leadership to appoint legislators to State Sovereignty Commission); State ex rel. Fatzer v.
Kansas Turnpike Auth., 176 Kan. 683, -, 273 P.2d 198, 200-01 (1954) (statute providing
for service of legislators on Turnpike Authority); State ex rel. Ray v. Blease, 95 S.C. 403,
__ ., 79 S.E. 247, 249-50 (1913) (legislative act placing legislators on State Sinking Fund
Commission).
' See, e.g., Parcell v. Kansas, 468 F.Supp. 1274, 1275 (D. Kan. 1979), aff'd sub nom
Parcell v. Governmental Ethics Comm'n, 639 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1980) (action for injunctive
relief by election campaign contributor); Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238 Ind. 120,
-. 149 N.E.2d 273, 277 (1958) (action by taxpayer); State ex rel. Anderson v. Fadely, 180
Kan. 652, __ , 308 P.2d 537, 540 (1957) (action in mandamus brought by attorney general);
Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 365 Mass. 639, __ , 309 N.E.2d
476, 478 (1974) (action by legislators to obtain advisory opinion); State ex rel. State Bldg.
Comm'n v. Bailey, 151 W.Va. 79, 80, 150 S.E.2d 449, 450 (1966) (action in mandamus by com-
mission against Secretary of State).
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boards is largely on a case-by-case basis," two distinct approaches have
emerged." Under the first approach, courts apply the separation of
powers principle strictly, striking down legislators' service on ad-
ministrative boards unless the service is incidental to the legislative
function.12 Under the second approach, courts follow a more flexible ap-
plication of separation of powers. 3 Courts which adopt the second ap-
II See, e.g., MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, __ , 499 P.2d 609, 610 (1972) (because
state constitution does not place exact limits on executive, legislative, and judicial powers
courts should decide separation of powers questions on case-by-case basis); State ex rel.
Meyer v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Neb. 490, -, 176 N.W.2d 920,
926 (1970) (impossibility of placing exact limits on separation of powers mandates that
courts resolve separation of powers problems on case-by-case basis).
1 See infra text accompanying notes 23-60 (cases following strict approach to separa-
tion of powers); infra text accompanying notes 67-113 (cases adopting flexible approach to
separation of powers).
12 See Stockman v. Leddy, 54 Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912), overruled on other grounds,
188 Colo. 310, __, 535 P.2d 200, 204 (1975); Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238 Ind.
120, 149 N.E.2d 273 (1958); State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982);
State ex rel. State Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey, 151 W.Va. 79, 150 S.E.2d 449 (1966). In
Stockman, the court considered whether a statute which empowered a joint committee of
the legislature to investigate violations of the state's water rights and to institute lawsuits
to vindicate the state's water rights contravened the doctrine of separation of powers. 54
Colo. at __, 129 P. at 220-22. The Stockman court noted that the legislature could have
appointed a committee of legislators to investigate water rights violations as an aid to the
lawmaking function without violating separation of powers. Id. at __ , 129 P. at 223. The
court held, however, that the legislature made no pretense of appointing the committee to
conduct investigations with a view toward future legislation. Id. at __ , 129 P. at 223.
Rather the legislature appointed the water rights committee with the intent that the com-
mittee would take actions to enforce the state's water rights. Id. at __ , 129 P. at 223.
The Stockman court concluded that by appointing its own members to the water rights com-
mittee, the legislature was attempting to confer executive power upon a collection of its
own members. Id. at __, 129 P. at 223. The court therefore held that the legislators' ser-
vice on the water rights committee contravened the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at
__ , 129 P. at 223. The Book court held that the membership of legislators on the State
Office Building Commission violated separation of powers because the primary duties of the
legislators on the Commission were executive in nature and in no way incidental to the
legislative power. 238 Ind. at __, 149 N.E.2d at 296. The Book court noted, however,
that the separation of powers doctrine does not bar the legislature from undertaking ac-
tivities which are properly incidental and germane to its legislative function. Id. at __ ,
149 N.E.2d at 296. The Bone court found the service of legislators on the state Environmen-
tal Management Commission violative of separation of powers because the legislators'
duties as Commission members had no relation to the legislators' lawmaking function. 304
N.C. at __ , 286 S.E.2d at 88. The Bailey court noted, in holding that service of
legislators on the State Building Commission violated separation of powers, that legislators
may exercise executive or judicial powers only to the extent that such powers are incidental
to the functions which the state constitution assigns to the legislature. 151 W.Va. at __ ,
150 S.E.2d at 453. See infra text accompanying notes 35-45 (discussion of Book); infra text
accompanying notes 46-60 (discussion of Bone).
13 See, e.g., Parker v. Riley, 18 Cal.2d 83, -, 113 P.2d 873, 877 (1941) (separation of
powers does not require rigid classification of all incidental activities of government);
Gillespie v. Barrett, 368 Ill. 612, ______, 15 N.E.2d 513, 514 (1938) (separation of powers is
merely statement of underlying principle of American form of government); State ex rel.
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proach uphold legislators' membership on administrative boards if the
courts are convinced that the legislators' membership represents a
cooperative effort with the executive branch. 4
In deciding whether the service of legislators on a given ad-
ministrative board violates the separation of powers doctrine, courts
look first to the functions performed by board members."5 Courts
generally characterize legislative functions as including fact-finding, 8
determining public policy, 1'7 and appropriating money. 8 Courts define ex-
ecutive functions as functions necessary to implement laws, 9 including
Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, -, 547 P.2d 786, 791 (1976) (strict application of
separation of powers inappropriate in complex state government in which administrative
agencies often exercise blend of legislative, executive, and judicial powers); State ex rel.
McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, __ , 236 S.E.2d 406, 409 (1977) (separation of powers
doctrine does not prevent legislators from serving on administrative boards in cooperative
effort with executive branch).
" See, e.g. State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett-,.219 Kan. 285, -, 547 P.2d 786, 792
(1976) (no usurpation of powers unless one department significantly interferes with opera-
tions of another); State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, -, 236 S.E.2d 406, 409
(1977) (separation of powers doctrine does not prevent legislators from serving on ad-
ministrative board or commission in cooperative effort with executive branch). See infra
text accompanying notes 74-93 (discussion of Bennett); infra text accompanying notes
106-113 (discussion of Edwards).
" See, e.g., Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238 Ind. 120, __ , 149 N.E.2d 273,
296 (1958) (court examined functions performed by State Office Building Commission before
ruling on separation of powers violation); State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285,
__ , 547 P.2d 786, 793 (1976) (first step court took in determining whether service of
legislators on state finance council violated separation of powers was to examine nature of
council functions).
,6 See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). The McGrain court recognized that
the power of inquiry, with authority to enforce compliance, is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. Id. at 174. State courts also have held that the
legislature has broad investigative powers, including the power to subpoena records and
witnesses. See, e.g., Parker v. Riley, 18 Cal.2d 83, __ , 113 P.2d 873, 877-78 (1941)
(legislators can serve on commission to investigate problems of interstate concern);
Sheridan v. Gardner, 347 Mass. 8, -, 196 N.E.2d 303, 307 (1964) (legislators can serve
on commission to study crime); State ex rel. James v. Aronson, 132 Mont. 120, -, 314
P.2d 849, 861-62 (1957) (legislators can serve on board of examiners organized by statute for
purpose of investigating and reporting on proposed legislation); Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J.
341, __ , 132 A.2d 1, 7-8 (1957) (legislators can serve on committee to study unauthorized
wiretapping).
" See City of Sand Springs v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 608 P.2d 1139, 1146 (Okla.
1980) (essence of legislative function is determination of policy).
'" See, e.g., Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Iowa 1975) (inherent in legislature's
power to appropriate is power to specify how executive branch shall spend money); State ex
rel. Anderson v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, -, 308 P.2d 537, 545 (1957) (except as limited by
constitution, legislature has exclusive power to decide how, when, and for what purposes to
appropriate public funds); State ex rel. Meyer v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment,
185 Neb. 490, __ , 176 N.W.2d 920, 926 (1970) (legislature can impose ceilings on spending
as incident of power to appropriate).
" See, e.g., Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667, 669, 212 S.E.2d 836, 838 (1975) (implementation
of specific legislation is duty of executive branch); Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238
Ind. 120, -, 149 N.E.2d 273, 296 (1958) (exercise of judgment and discretion in im-
plementing law enacted by legislature is executive function).
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the managing of departments of government" and spending money ap-
propriated by the legislature.' Most legislators serving on ad-
ministrative boards, however, do not perform functions which are clearly
executive or clearly legislative in nature.' Thus, whether the participa-
tion of legislators who perform duties that are not clearly either
legislative or executive in nature violates separation of powers will de-
pend on whether the court employs a strict or flexible application of the
doctrine.
Springer v. Philippine Islands" was the most influential case in a
line of early Supreme Court cases in which the Court gave the doctrine
of separation of powers a strict application. 4 In Springer, the legislature
of the Philippine Islands passed acts which provided that the Governor-
General, President of the Senate, and Speaker of the House of Represent-
atives should sit as a Board of Control over a government-owned bank
and coal company.' In these acts, the legislature gave the Board of Con-
trol voting power over the stock of the bank and coal company and the
power to elect boards of directors and managing agents. Because the
President of the Senate and Speaker of the House voted together, the
legislature had control of appointments to the boards of directors.' The
Governor-General brought an action in quo warranto challenging the
right of the two legislative members of the Board of Control to vote for
directors.'
2 See, e.g., Starnes v. Sadler, 237 Ark. 325, __ , 372 S.W.2d 585, 586 (1963) (day-to-
day management of state colleges and prisons is executive function); Opinion of the Justices,
380 A.2d 109, 116 (Del. 1977) (day-to-day management of state capitol is executive function).
2 See Anderson v. Lamm, 195 Colo. 437, 579 P.2d 620 (1978) (en banc). The Anderson
court observed that the executive branch has the power to administer funds which the
legislature has appropriated for programs which the legislature has enacted. Id. at ___,
579 P.2d at 623-24.
1 See, e.g., Parcell v. Kansas, 468 F.Supp. 1274, 1279 (D. Kan. 1979), affd sub nom
Parcell v. Governmental Ethics Comm'n, 639 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1980) (legislatively ap-
pointed members of Governmental Ethics Commission performed blend of executive and
legislative functions); State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 593, 286 S.E.2d 79, 80
(1982) (Environmental Management Commission had quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers); see infra text accompanying notes 94-105 (discussion of Parcell); infra text accom-
panying notes 46-60 (discussion of Bone).
2 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
2, See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926) (courts should keep three
branches of government separate unless Constitution expressly requires blending);
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880) (courts should clearly define lines separating
the three branches of government).
I Springer, 277 U.S. at 197-98; see Act of March 5, 1919, No. 2822, Philippine
Legislature (Board of Control has voting power over coal company); Act of January 30, 1921,
No. 2938, Philippine Legislature (gave Board of Control voting power over bank).
,1 277 U.S. at 198.
2? Id. at 199.
Id. Quo warranto is a remedy which belongs to the state in its sovereign capacity.
Citizens Util. Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App.3d 399, 405-06, 128 Cal. Rptr. 582, 588
(1976). The purpose of a quo warranto action is to prevent a continuing exercise by a public
office-holder of unlawfully asserted authority. People ex rel. Cromer v. Village of Maywood,
1983]
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The Springer Court noted that the Organic Act of the Philippine
Islands placed the power to appoint government officials solely with the
Governor-General.' Considering the managing officers of the govern-
ment-owned bank and coal company to be government officials, the
Court held that in voting for the boards of directors the legislators on
the Board of Control were exercising an executive function." The Springer
Court reasoned that the power to elect board members did not aid the
legislators in performance of their duties as lawmakers. 1 Under the
strict reading of separation of powers, the Court therefore found the
power of the legislators to elect the boards of directors violative of
separation of powers.2 The Springer Court affirmed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands ousting the legislative members
from the Board of Control.' The Supreme Court continued this strict in-
terpretation of separation of powers in subsequent cases. 4
Book v. State Office Building Commission 5 is one of several decis-
ions in which state courts followed the Supreme Court's strict applica-
tion of separation of powers. In Book, the Indiana Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the creation by the Indiana legislature of the State Of-
381 Ill. 337, -, 45 N.E.2d 617, 619 (1942). State attorneys general ordinarily have
responsibility for prosecuting quo warranto actions on behalf of their states. See State ex
rel. Fatzer v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., 176 Kan. 683, 273 P.2d 198 (1954).
' 277 U.S. at 201; see, e.g., Philippine Islands Organic Act, ch. 416, §§ 21-22, 39 Stat.
545 (1916). Section 21 of the Organic Act gave the Governor General supervisory powers
over all of the departments and bureaus of the Philippine government and made the Gov-
ernor General responsible for the faithful execution of the laws. 277 U.S. at 200; see Organic
Act, § 21. Section 22 vested the Governor General with the power to appoint government of-
ficials. 277 U.S. at 201; see Organic Act, § 22.
' 277 U.S. at 202. The Springer Court reasoned that even if the boards of directors of
the bank and coal company were not public officials in the strict sense, the board members
at least were public agents charged with day-to-day supervision of the bank and coal com-
pany. Id. at 203. The Court therefore concluded that by electing these directors, the
legislators on the Board of Control were usurping the executive power of appointment. Id.
The Springer Court found Stockman v. Leddy analogous. Id.; see Stockman v. Leddy, 54
Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912), overruled on other grounds, 188 Colo. 310, -, 535 P.2d 200,
204 (1975).
3, 277 U.S. at 202.
s Id. at 201-02. Justice Holmes registered a vigorous dissent in Springer. Id. at 209.
Justice Holmes argued that the proper application of the great principles of the Constitu-
tion is not perfectly clear-cut. Id. Justice Holmes observed that courts would face an im-
possible task in attempting to distinguish between legislative and executive action with
mathematical precision. Id. at 211. Justice Holmes concluded that division of the three branches
of government into watertight compartments not only was undesirable but also was not a
requirement of the Constitution. Id.
, Id. at 209.
See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630-32 (1935) (President's
power to remove government officials does not extend to officials in agency wholly uncon-
nected with executive department); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530, 551
(1933) (one branch of government should never exert coercive influence directly or indirectly
over either of other two branches).
238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273 (1958).
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fice Building Commission, composed of both legislators and executive
department officials, violated separation of powers." Legislators made
up a majority of the Commission membership. 7 The primary duties of
the Commission included acquiring a site for a new state office building,
adopting a design for the building, issuing bonds to finance its construc-
tion, overseeing its construction, and allocating office space in the
building among state agencies.' The legislature also vested the Commis-
sion with power to hire employees and agents to carry out the Commis-
sion's functions. 9 A state taxpayer brought an action charging that the
legislators' exercise of these powers as members of the Commission
violated the doctrine of separation of powers."
The Book court noted that the powers the Indiana legislature vested
in the Commission, which included the appointment of public officials
and general administration of the new office building, were essentially
executive in nature." The Book court further concluded that the perform-
ance of the Commission's legislative members was unrelated to their
duties as lawmakers.42 The court reasoned that as members of the Com-
mission, the legislators were exercising the type of judgment and discre-
tion which the state constitution reserved to executive branch officials.
4 3
The Book court, therefore, held that the legislators' service on the Com-
mission violated the principle of separation of powers.44 The Book court
further ruled that the governor had the power to appoint Commission
", Id. at __ , 149 N.E.2d at 293; see IND. CODE ANN. §§ 60-2101-60-2134 (Burns
Supp. 1951) (legislation creating State Office Building Commission) (renumbered as IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-13-11-1-4-13-11-38 (Burns 1974) and repealed by Acts 1977, P.L. 31, § 7).
238 Ind. at __ , 149 N.E.2d at 293.
Id. at __, 149 N.E.2d at 295-96.
Id. at __, 149 N.E.2d at 295-96.
:o Id. at __ , 149 N.E.2d at 277-78.
, Id. at -, 149 N.E.2d at 296; see supra text accompanying notes 19-21 (traditionally
executive functions).
42 238 Ind. at ___, 149 N.E.2d at 296.
'3 Id. at __, 149 N.E.2d at 296.
Id. at __ , 149 N.E.2d at 296-97; see also Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667, 669-70, 212
S.E.2d 836, 838-39 (1975). The Book court warned that if legislatures could appoint their own
members to boards exercising executive and administrative functions, the potential would
exist for the legislature to assume complete control over the executive branch. 238 Ind. at
__._, 149 N.E.2d at 296-97. The Book court observed that since six of the eight State Of-
fice Building Commission members were legislators, the legislature could control every act
of the Commission. Id. at __ , 149 N.E.2d at 296-97. The Greer court shared the Book
court's concern that by permitting legislators to serve on boards performing executive and
administrative functions, courts would be allowing legislatures to appoint ad hoc commit-
tees of their own members to implement specific legislation. 233 Ga. at 669, 212 S.E.2d at
838. In Greer, even though only six of the twenty members of the administrative board in
question were legislators, the court concluded that the lawmakers' presence on the board
usurped executive powers. Id. at 669-71, 212 S.E.2d at 837-39. The Book court was careful to
point out, however, that the doctrine of separation of powers does not bar the legislature
from engaging in activities which are properly incidental and germane to the legislative
power. 238 Ind. at ___, 149 N.E.2d at 296.
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members to fill the positions that the legislative members formerly
held.45
The strict approach to separation of powers issues advocated by the
Book court recently received strong reaffirmance by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in State ex rel Wallace v. Bone." In Bone, the North
Carolina legislature increased the size of the state Environmental
Management Commission in order to allow the legislature to appoint
four of its own members to the Commission.47 Prior to the legislature's
action, the Commission was staffed by administrative officials, all ap-
pointed by the governor." Powers exercised by Commission members in-
cluded promulgating standards and regulations concerning air and water
pollution, granting and revoking permits, conducting investigations, and
instituting court actions against violators."' Additionally, the Commis-
sion had the duty of general supervision over local air pollution control
programs."0 A group of the Commission's original members brought suit,
charging that the statute providing for appointment of legislators to the
Commission violated the doctrine of separation of powers.5"
The trial court in Bone concluded that the legislative members of the
Commission, who were in the minority, were in no position to usurp ex-
ecutive branch functions.2 The trial court, therefore, upheld the legis-
lators' service on the Commission as a cooperative effort with the ex-
ecutive branch. 3 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed after con-
sidering the history of the separation of powers doctrine in North
Carolina and in other states. 4 The Bone court observed that North
Carolina courts traditionally had followed a strict application of separa-
tion of powers."5 The court also considered a strict interpretation of the
's Id. at __, 149 N.E.2d at 298.
's 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982).
Id. at 593-94, 606-07, 286 S.E.2d at 79-80, 87. Before the North Carolina legislature
passed the statute providing for the appointment of four legislators to the Environmental
Management Commission, the Commission consisted of thirteen members. Id. at 593, 286
S.E.2d at 80. The statute provided for the speaker of the state house of representatives to
appoint two house members to the Commission and for the president of the state senate to
appoint two senate members. Id. at 592, 286 S.E.2d at 79-80.
Id. at 593, 286 S.E.2d at 80.
Id. at 607, 286 S.E.2d at 88.
Id. at 607-08, 286 S.E.2d at 88.
', Id. at 591-92, 286 S.E.2d at 79.
52 Id. at 594, 286 S.E.2d at 81. The Bone trial court emphasized that the clear minority
position of legislators on the Commission was a critical factor in its decision. Id. at 594, 286
S.E.2d at 81. The trial court judge stated that he found the South Carolina Supreme Court's
decision in State ex reL McLeod v. Edwards to be very persuasive. 304 N.C. at 604, 286
S.E.2d at 86; see State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977; infra
text accompanying notes 106-113 (discussion of Edwards).
304 N.C. at 594, 286 S.E.2d at 81.
Id. at 595-606, 609, 286 S.E.2d at 81-87, 89.
Id. at 599-601, 286 S.E.2d at 83-84. The Bone court noted that each subsequent
redrafting of the North Carolina Constitution retained a strongly worded separation of
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doctrine to be consistent with the decisions of other courts." The Bone
court reasoned that the fundamental importance of the separation of
powers to sound governmental operation justified a strict application of
the doctrine. The Bone court held that the duties of the Commission
clearly were executive or administrative in nature and had no relation to
the lawmaking function of the executive branch." The North Carolina
Supreme Court, therefore, held that the legislature's appointment of
lawmakers as Commission members violated separation of powers. 9 The
Bone court allowed the Commission to continue in existence without the
legislative members."
The recent rise in prominence of administrative agencies has com-
plicated greatly the task of the courts in ruling on separation of powers
violations." In an effort to deal with the increasingly complex problems
powers clause. Id. at 595, 286 S.E.2d at 81. The Bone court also observed that the fact that
North Carolina is one of the few states which does not empower its governor to veto
legislative enactments is an indication that the state follows a strict approach to separation
of powers. Id. at 599, 286 S.E.2d at 83. Numerous efforts to amend the constitution to give
the governor the veto power had failed, leading the court to draw the implication that the
people of North Carolina do not want the governor to have any direct control over the
legislative branch. Id. at 599, 286 S.E.2d at 83. The Bone court concluded that the small
number of cases over the years in which a party alleged that a branch of the North Carolina
government was violating separation of powers was also strong evidence that the North
Carolina government had adhered strictly to the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at
599-601, 286 S.E.2d at 83-84.
Id. at 601, 286 S.E.2d at 84. The Bone court gave detailed consideration to a number
of strict separation of powers cases. Id. at 601-06, 286 S.E.2d at 84-87. Among the cases the
Bone court cited were O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933);Stockman v. Leddy, 54
Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912), overruled on other grounds, 188 Colo. 310, -, 535 P.2d 200,
204 (1975); Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667, 212 S.E.2d 836 (1975); Book v. State Office Bldg.
Comm'n, 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273 (1958); State ex rel. State Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey, 151
W.Va. 79, 150 S.E.2d 449 (1966). 304 N.C. at 601-04, 286 S.E.2d at 84-86. The Bone court also
considered State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786 (1976), and State
ex tel. McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977), two cases which advocated a
flexible approch. 304 N.C. at 604-06, 286 S.E.2d at 86-87. The Bone court, however, chose not
to follow Bennett and Edwards, reasoning that the courts which decided those two cases
had deviated from the principle of separation of powers. Id. at 604, 286 S.E.2d at 86. The
Bone court further distinguished Edwards on the ground that the legislators serving on the
State Budget and Control Board in Edwards were ex officio members, while the North
Carolina legislators serving on the Environmental Management Commission were not'ex of-
ficio. Id. at 604, 286 S.E.2d at 86; see infra note 109 (explanation of ex officio status).
304 N.C. at 601, 286 S.E.2d at 84.
Id. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88.
Id. at 608-09, 286 S.E.2d at 88-89. Although the Bone court held that membership of
legislators on the Commission violated separation of powers, the court recognized the
beneficial effects of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. Id. at 608,
286 S.E.2d at 88. In particular, the Bone court observed that the work of study commissions,
on which both legislators and executive officials served, had resulted in many excellent pro-
posals for new legislation. Id. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88.
' Id. at 608-09, 286 S.E.2d at 88 (invalidation of statute merely removed legislators
from Commission).
1 See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). In his
19831
182 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
facing modern society, legislatures have created and utilized ad-
ministrative agencies.2 Legislatures typically vest these agencies with a
blend of executive, lawmaking, and judicial powers." Thus, most ad-
ministrative agencies do not fit neatly within one of the three traditional
branches of government. 4 In deciding whether legislators' service on ad-
ministrative boards violates the separation of powers doctrine, courts
have endeavored to balance two conflicting considerations. On one hand,
courts wish to allow legislatures sufficient flexibility to employ in-
novative governmental arrangements.65 On the other hand, the courts
have an obligation to insure that the legislature does not usurp functions
properly belonging to the executive or judicial branches.6
Ruberoid dissent, Justice Jackson recognized that administrative agencies have become a
fourth branch of government which has disrupted the neat symmetry of the traditional
three-branch system. Id. at 487. Justice Jackson observed that courts at various times have
labeled administrative agencies as quasi-legislative, quasi-executive, or quasi-judicial. Id.
Justice Jackson stated that the use of the term "quasi" signifies that the traditional
classifications have broken down. Id. at 487-88. Justice Jackson likened "quasi" to "a smooth
cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a
disordered bed." Id. at 488. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.09
(1958) (complication of separation of powers issue as result of increased use of ad-
ministrative agencies).
' See, e.g., Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); Sunshine Anth-
racite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940). The Opp Court observed that in an increasingly
complex society, Congress could not perform its functions if courts required Congress to
research all the subsidiary facts underlying the defined legislative policy with respect to
tariff rates, railroad rates, and minimum wage rates. 312 U.S. at 145. The Opp Court stated
that to fulfill the legislative function, Congress merely has to determine legislative policy
and formilate this policy as a rule of conduct. Id. The Anthracite Coal Court observed that
the delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies "has long been recognized as
necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not become a futility." 310
U.S. at 398. See generally DAVIS, supra note 61, § 1.09, at 73; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 33-40 (1965). Davis points out that Montesquieu and other early
philosophers who advocated a strict separation of the three branches of government had no
idea that governments would be involved in regulating airlines, television networks,
railroads, or securities exchanges. DAVIS, supra note 61, at 73. Jaffe indicates that
legislatures are most likely to delegate power to administrative agencies when the matters
requiring regulation are highly technical or when their regulation requires a course of con-
tinuous decision. JAFFE, supra, at 36. Jaffe further argues that in areas of regulation in
which both technical skill and continuous judgment are necessary, legislatures would be
helpless without the expertise of administrative agencies. Id. at 37.
' See supra text accompanying note 22 (examples of administrative agencies exercis-
ing blend of legislative, executive, and judicial functions).
See supra note 61 (difficulty of classifying administrative agencies as within one of
three traditional branches of government).
See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 380 A.2d 109, 114 (Del. 1977) (certain degree of
pragmatic flexibility necessary in courts' application of separation of powers to allow for
newly perceived needs and practical exigencies); Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 677, __, 212
S.E.2d 836, 838 (1975) (separation of powers sufficiently flexible to permit practical ar-
rangements in complex government); State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285,
__ , 547 P.2d 786, 791 (1976) (courts must maintain sufficient flexibility in political
system to experiment and seek new methods of improving governmental efficiency).
See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 380 A.2d 109, 113 (Del. 1977) (courts must apply
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In response to legislatures' increased reliance upon administrative
agencies and the consequent blurring of distinctions among the three
branches of government, federal courts have begun to adopt a flexible
approach to the doctrine of separation of powers. 7 In Nixon v. Adminis-
trator of General Services,8 former President Nixon challenged as
violative of separation of powers an act of Congress which regulated the
disposition and custody of the former President's executive documents. 9
The Supreme Court, however, rejected Nixon's argument. ° The Court
emphasized that Nixon's view that the separation of powers doctrine re-
quired three airtight departments of government was inconsistent with
the origins of the doctrine, recent Supreme Court decisions, and the con-
temporary realities of the political system.7 The Nixon Court held that a
legislative act violates the separation of powers doctrine only if the act
significantly disrupts the executive branch's performance of its duties
and is unnecessary to promote an overriding objective within the
legislature's constitutional authority.2
A number of recent state cases have followed the Supreme Court's
lead in adopting a flexible approach to separation of powers.7 In State
separation of powers doctrine to prevent one branch of government from encroaching upon
another branch's domain); State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, __, 547 P.2d
786, 791 (1976) (courts must never lose sight of danger of unchecked power concentrated in
one branch of government).
" See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (Constitution by no means con-
templates hermetic sealing off of three branches of government from one another); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (framers of Constitution never intended that three
branches of government should operate with complete independence); Chadha v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1980), appeal pending 454 U.S. 812
(Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-1832) (separation of powers pervasive in American system of govern-
ment yet sufficiently fluid to allow novel governmental arrangements); United States v.
Northside Realty Ass'n Inc. (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 613 F.2d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 1980)
(separation of powers requires only proper balance among three branches of government);
Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 667 (5th Cir. 1979) (separation of powers merely
prohibits one branch from unduly impeding operation of coordinate branch), cert. denied 449
U.S. 1076 (1981); United States v. Brainer, 515 F.Supp. 627, 630 (D.Md. 1981) (framers of
Constitution never intended complete separation of powers).
433 U.S. 425 (1977).
s Id. at 429. Former President Nixon challenged the Presidential Recordings and
Material Preservation Act, which directed the administrator of General Services to take
custody of former President Nixon's presidential papers and tape recordings, as violative of
separation of powers. Id.; see 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
433 U.S. at 441.
71 Id. In concluding that a rigid application of separation of powers was inappropriate,
the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services placed primary reliance
on United States v. Nixon. Id. at 442-46; see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)
(in dividing the powers of government among three co-equal branches framers of Constitu-
tion did not intend that separate powers should operate with absolute independence).
" 433 U.S. at 443.
" See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 380 A.2d 109, 114 (Del. 1977) (certain degree of
pragmatic flexibility in application of separation of powers essential to maximum success of
American constitutional system); State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 
547 P.2d 786, 791 (1976) (strict application of separation of powers inappropriate in complex
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ex reL Schneider v. Bennett, 4 the Kansas Supreme Court used a flexible
approach to find membership of legislators on the State Finance Council
impermissible." In Bennett, the attorney general brought a quo war-
ranto action challenging, on separation of powers grounds, the right of
state legislators to serve on the State Finance Council." The Council con-
sisted of the governor and eight legislators holding leadership positions
in the Kansas legislature." The Council's principal duties included ad-
ministering the Kansas civil service act and supervising both the state
department of administration and the state division of personel. 8 The
Finance Council's duties also included approving supplemental ap-
propriations to departments of state government7 9 and making ap-
propriations from the state emergency fund. °
Before ruling on whether the service of legislators on the Finance
Council violated separation of powers, the Bennett court examined the
development, in previous Kansas cases, of a flexible approach to separa-
tion of powers. 1 The Bennett court reasoned that a legislative measure
does not usurp executive branch functions and thus does not violate
separation of powers unless the measure significantly interferes with ex-
ecutive branch operations.82 The Bennett court developed a four-part
state government); State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, , 236 S.E.2d 406,
409 (1977) (separation of powers doctrine is sufficiently flexible to permit cooperative efforts
between legislative and executive branches); Coates v. Windham, 613 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1981) (courts should not interpret separation of powers in way which hinders
cooperation or coordination between two or more branches of government); see infra text
accompanying notes 74-93 (discussion of Bennett); infra text accompanying notes 106-113
(discussion of Edwards).
7, 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786 (1976).
71 Id. at __ , 547 P.2d at 797-98.
78 Id. at __, 547 P.2d at 789; see supra note 28 (definition of quo warranto).
Id. at __, 547 P.2d at 794.
78 Id. at __, 547 P.2d at 795.
Id. at __, 547 P.2d at 795-96. The state Finance Council in Bennett had the
power to make supplemental appropriations to government departments to meet unforseen
contingencies arising while the legislature was not in session. Id. at __, 547 P.2d at
795-96.
' Id. at __, 547 P.2d at 796. The purpose of the Finance Council's power to make
appropriations from the state emergency fund was to meet extraordinary conditions when
prompt state action was essential to preserve public health and welfare, such as natural
disasters. Id. at __, 547 P.2d at 796.
" Id. at __ , 547 P.2d at 790-92. The Bennett court noted that Kansas courts had ap-
plied the separation of powers doctrine both in a strict and in a flexible manner. Id. at
__ , 547 P.2d at 790. State ex rel. Fatzer v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., 176 Kan. 683, 273
P.2d 198 (1954), and State ex rel. Anderson v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, 308 P.2d 537 (1957),
were two earlier cases the Bennett court relied on which also involved legislators' service
on administrative boards. 219 Kan. at __, 547 P.2d at 792. The Fatzer and Fadely courts
both held that a legislator may serve on an administrative board so long as his service does
not constitute an attempt to usurp executive branch functions. Id. at __, 547 P.2d at 792.
1 Id. at __ , 547 P.2d at 792; see Note, Treatment of the Separation of Powers Doc-
trine in Kansas, 29 KAN. L. REv. 243 (1980) (development of doctrine).
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test for determining whether a legislator's service on an administrative
board usurps executive branch functions and therefore violates the prin-
ciple of separation of powers.' The first factor was whether the essential
nature of the power being exercised by the legislators on the board is
legislative or executive in nature. 4 The second factor was whether the
legislative branch exerts any control over the executive branch by
vesting the legislative members of the board with executive duties.
The Bennett court's third factor was whether the legislature appoints its
own members to administrative boards in order to foster cooperation
with the executive branch or to establish superiority over the executive
branch. 8 The fourth factor was whether the board's blending of legis-
lative and executive powers results, over a period of time, in the
legislature's usurpation of executive branch functions.
The Bennett court devoted the bulk of its analysis to the first factor,
whether the Council's members performed executive or legislative func-
tions." The court reasoned that the Finance Council's supervisory power
over the department of administration, the civil service act, and the divis-
ion of personnel involved the legislative members of the Council in the
day-to-day operations of the executive branch. The Bennett court con-
cluded that these supervisory powers were executive in nature. Con-
cerning the second factor, whether the legislators' membership allows
the legislature to exert control over the executive branch, the Bennett
court concluded that by vesting supervisory powers in the Finance
Council, the legislature exerted a coercive influence over the executive
branch." Of particular importance to the court's finding of coercive in-
fluence was the fact that the department of administration could not
function effectively unless the Finance Council, in which legislators were
the majority, approved the rules and regulations governing the depart-
ment's everyday operations.2 Having concluded, on the basis of the first
two factors of its proposed test, that the legislators' membership was im-
permissible, the Bennett court considered the application of the final
two factors unnecessary. 3
Id. at __,547 P.2d at 792-93.
Id. at __,547 P.2d at 792.
Id. at __,547 P.2d at 792; see supra text accompanying notes 19-21 (definition of
executive duties).
" Id. at __,547 P.2d at 792.
87 Id. at __,547 P.2d at 792.
Id. at __,547 P.2d at 793-97.
Id. at __,547 P.2d at 797.
Id. at __,547 P.2d at 797; see supra text accompanying notes 19-21 (definition of
executive duties).
". Id. at __,547 P.2d at 797-98.
Id. at __,547 P.2d at 797.
Id. at __,547 P.2d at 798. The Bennett court upheld the Finance Council's power
to make appropriations from the state emergency fund as a cooperative venture between
the legislative and executive branches. Id. at __, 547 P.2d at 798. Because the Finance
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In Parcell v. Kansas94 the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas applied the four-part Bennett test to another separa-
tion of powers challenge.95 In Parcell, a contributor to the campaign of a
candidate for state office sought to enjoin enforcement of the Kansas
Campaign Finance Act.96 The contributor argued that a provision of the
Act which empowered the legislature to appoint several members of the
Governmental Ethics Commission violated the separation of powers doc-
trine.97 Duties of the Commission involved adopting rules and regula-
tions for administration of the Act, reviewing campaign finance reports
of elected state officials, and investigating alleged violations of the Act.99
Concerning the first factor of the Bennett test, whether the powers
exercised by Commission members were executive or legislative in
nature, the Parcell court concluded that Commission members performed
a blend of legislative and executive functions.99 Important to the Parcell
court's conclusion on the first factor were the facts that the
Commission's duties included historically legislative functions, such as
the power to conduct investigations and the duty to submit an annual
report and recommendations to both the governor and the legislature.'
Concerning the second factor of the Bennett test, the degree of control
over the Commission exercised by the legislature, the Parcell court con-
cluded that even though legislators had the power to appoint a majority
of Commission members, the legislature's control of the Commission was
not coercive."' Regarding the third factor of the Bennett test, whether
Council could invoke this emergency appropriation power only by unanimous vote and only
in extraordinary situations such as major disasters, the court ruled that the legislators' par-
ticipation in the exercise of this power did not usurp executive functions. Id. at __, 547
P.2d at 798.
" 468 F.Supp. 1274 (D. Kan. 1979), affd sub nom Parcell v. Governmental Ethics
Comm'n, 639 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1980).
's 468 F. Supp. at 1278-80. Even though the litigants in Parcell chose to pursue the
case in federal court, the controversy in Parcell took place in Kansas and involved the inter-
pretation of a Kansas statute. 468 F.Supp. at 1277. Since the federal constitution does not
require states to follow the federal doctrine on separation of powers, Kansas law on separa-
tion of powers governed the Parcell court's determination. Id. at 1278; see supra note 3
(states not bound by federal separation of powers law).
0 468 F.Supp. at 1275; see KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-4101-25-4141 (1981) (repealed by L.
1981, ch. 171, § 51).
468 F.Supp. at 1276.
" Id. at 1278-79.
Id. at 1279.
100 Id.
o Id. Important to the Parcell court's conclusion that the legislature did not exercise a
coercive influence over the Governmental Ethics Commission was the fact that the
legislature had split up the power to appoint six Commission members among four in-
dividual legislators. Id. Additionally, the court observed that the Kansas Campaign Finance
Act did not require the legislature to confirm the five appointments made to the Commis-
sion by the governor. Id. Even though the Act required the vote of only six Commission
members to conduct business, the court did not consider the legislature's control over the
Commission violative of separation of powers. Id.
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the legislature intended to usurp executive functions, the Parcell court
reasoned that the appointment scheme, which the legislature had designed
to insure an independent Commission, was evidence that the legislature
had not intended to .usurp executive functions."2 With respect to the
fourth factor of the Bennett test, the practical result of blending ex-
ecutive and legislative functions in the Commission, the Parcell court
observed that allowing legislators to serve as Commission members had
aided the Commission in conducting investigations.' On the basis of the
Bennett test, the Parcell court concluded that the blending of executive
and legislative powers had not resulted, as a practical matter, in any
significant encroachment by the legislative branch on the executive.'
The Parcell court therefore held that even though the Act gave
legislators the power to appoint a majority of Commission members, no
separation of powers violation existed.'
In State ex reL McLeod v. Edwards,' the South Carolina Supreme
Court also followed a flexible approach to separation of powers.' ° In Ed-
wards, the South Carolina Attorney General brought suit alleging that
the service of legislators on the State Budget and Control Board violated
the separation of powers doctrine."0 The Board consisted of the governor,
the state treasurer, the controller general, the chairman of the senate
finance committee, and the chairman of the house ways and means com-
mittee, all ex officio members.' The Board performed its duty of
102 Id. The Parcell court observed that the Kansas legislature had designed the appoint-
ment scheme to provide for a Commission with a balanced membership both along political
party lines and executive and legislative branch lines. Id. Under the Act no more than three
of the five Commission members appointed by the governor could be from the same political
party as the governor. Id. The Act divided the legislative power to appoint Commission
members so that the president of the senate and the speaker of the house each would ap-
point two, and the minority leader of the senate and the minority leader of the house each
would appoint one. Id. Thus, even if the house speaker and president of the senate were
from the same political party as the governor, no more than seven of the Commission
members could be of the same party affiliation. Id. The Parcell court therefore concluded
that the legislature's reason for developing this appointment system was not to usurp ex-
ecutive functions, but rather to insure that the Commission would have the necessary in-
dependence to investigate the election campaign finances of any elected state officials. Id.
10 Id. In ruling on the fourth factor of the Bennett test, the Parcell court merely stated
that the court found that the appointment scheme devised by the legislature probably had
aided the Commission in conducting investigations into the campaign finances of the appoint-
ing authorities. Id. The court accepted the stipulation of the parties that the Commission
routinely had conducted such investigations. Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
100 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977).
o Id. at __, 236 S.E.2d at 409.
108 Id. at _ , 236 S.E.2d at 406-07.
10 Id. at __, 236 S.E.2d at 406. An ex officio member of a board is one who is a
member solely by virtue of his title to a certain office and without further appointment.
State ex rel. Hennepin County v. Brandt, 225 Minn. 345, _, 31 N.W.2d 5, 9-10 (1948). In
Edwards, the legislative members of the State Budget and Control Board held their Board
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general supervision of the fiscal affairs of the state government, through
three divisions, the Finance Division, the Purchasing and Property Divis-
ion, and the Division of Personnel Administration."' In deciding whether
legislators' service on the Board violated separation of powers, the Ed-
wards court found dispositive the fact that the legislature had put
legislators in a minority on the Board."' The court noted that the
legislature, by placing the chairmen of the house ways and means com-
mittee and senate finance committee on the Board, provided the Board
with a great deal of valuable expertise."' In view of the ex officio nature
of the legislators' membership and the minority position of legislators on
the Board, the Edwards court upheld membership of the lawmakers on
the Board as a cooperative effort with the executive branch."'
Both courts which apply separation of powers strictly and courts
which apply the doctrine flexibly have recognized the benefits of
memberships solely by virtue of holding the offices of Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee and Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. 269 S.C. at ___, 236
S.E.2d at 406.
.. Id. at __, 236 S.E.2d at 407.
" Id. at __, 236 S.E.2d at 408.
' Id. at __, 236 S.E.2d at 409.
"1 Id. at __ , 236 S.E.2d at 409. But see State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, __ S.C.
__ , 295 S.E.2d 633 (1982). In McInnis, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
South Carolina legislature's creation of a Joint Appropriation Review Committee, composed
of six members of the state Senate and six members of the state House of Representatives,
violated separation of powers. Id. at __ , 295 S.E.2d at 639. The legislature vested the
Committee with a veto power over the expenditure and allocation by any agency of state
government of funds received by an agency directly from the federal government. Id. at
___, 295 S.E.2d at 638. The legislature had formed the Committee in an attempt to regain
control over the determination of public policy and the appropriation of moneys within state
government. Id. at __ , 295 S.E.2d at 637. Many agencies of state government which
received substantial federal funds had been able, as a practical matter, to override the
legislature's determinations of public policy and appropriations. Id. at __ , 295 S.E.2d at
637. The South Carolina Attorney General brought an action for a declaratory judgment in
which he attacked the legislature's creation of the committee as an unconstitutional attempt
to confer executive authority upon members of the legislature. Id. at __ , 295 S.E.2d at
634. The defendant committee members contended, however, that the committee was
necessary to the legislature's full and effective exercise of the appropriation power. Id. at
__._, 295 S.E.2d at 634. In reaching its result, the McInnis court noted that the legislature
could have exercised control over the expenditure of federal funds by legislation. Id. at
__ ._, 295 S.E.2d at 638. The McInnis court observed, however, that the legislature had at-
tempted to control the expenditure of federal funds by setting up a committee of twelve
legislators as an administrative or executive board. Id. at __, 295 S.E.2d at 638. Thus,
the court concluded that the committee violated separation of powers. Id. at __, 295
S.E.2d at 639. The McInnis court rejected the defendant's contention that State ex rel
McLeod v. Edwards controlled the result on the ground that the degree of involvement of
the legislators in executive functions was greater in McInnis than in Edwards. Id. at __
295 S.E.2d at 639. See State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977);
supra text accompanying notes 106-112 (discussion of Edwards). The McInnis court em-
phasized that courts must determine each separation of powers controversy on its own
facts. __ S.C. at __, 295 S.E.2d at 639.
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cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment.1 ' A strict application of separation of powers, such as that followed
by the Bone and Book courts, severely limits opportunities for coopera-
tion among the branches of government."' A flexible application such as
that followed by the Bennett and Edwards courts maximizes oppor-
tunities for interbranch cooperation.' Most importantly, a flexible ap-
proach adequately safeguards the governmental interests that the
framers of the Constitution intended the separation of powers doctrine
to protect. 17 Therefore, both on historical grounds and in view of the
complex problems facing present day government, a strict application of
separation of powers is inappropriate. 8 In ruling on separation of
powers challenges to legislators serving on administrative boards,
courts should construe the doctrine liberally to uphold legitimate
cooperative efforts between the executive and legislative branches
whenever possible. 9
MICHAEL J. FARR
1 See, e.g., State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, -, 547 P.2d 786, 793
(1976) (governmental economy and efficiency); Opinion of the Justices to the House of
Representatives, 365 Mass. 639, , 309 N.E.2d 476, 479 (1974) (governmental economy);
State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 608, 286 S.E.2d 79, 88 (1982) (use of interbranch
study groups to generate proposals for new laws considered beneficial); State ex rel.
McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, , 236 S.E.2d 406, 409 (1977) (sharing special exper-
tise of each branch).
"' See Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 365 Mass. 639, 309
N.E.2d 476 (1974). The Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned that the strict separation of
powers provision in the state constitution required that the court strike down a legislative
proposal for a central data processing system for all three branches of government. Id. at
__ ., 309 N.E.2d at 478. The court held the plan violative of separation of powers even
though the court recognized the advantages of the plan in terms of governmental economy
and efficiency. Id. at __ , 309 N.E.2d at 479.
1"6 See, e.g., Parcell v. Kansas, 468 F. Supp. 1274, 1280 (D. Kan. 1979), affd sub nom
Parcell v. Governmental Ethics Comm'n, 639 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1980) (cooperation between
executive and legislative branches in enforcing campaign finance statute even though
legislators appointed majority of enforcement board); State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 269
S.C. 75, , 236 S.E.2d 406, 409 (1977) (executive members of Budget and Control Board
derived valuable assistance from service on Board of chairmen of the two finance commit-
tees of legislature); see supra text accompanying notes 94-105 (discussion of Parcell); supra
text accompanying notes 106-113 (discussion of Edwards).
1"7 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 338 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1966). James Madison
argued that Montesquieu's admonition that no liberty can exist when the legislative and ex-
ecutive powers are united in the same branch only meant that when the whole power of one
branch exercises the whole power of another branch, the fundamental principles of a free
constitution are subverted. Id.; supra note 2.
"' See supra note 2 (historical background); supra note 62 (complex problems requiring
governmental action).
"9 See supra text accompanying notes 94-105 (application by Parcell court of Bennett
flexible test); supra text accompanying notes 106-113 (Edwards court cooperative effort
flexible approach).
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